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Abstract 
Security aspects in communication systems are becoming more and more significant day by day. New methods for improved 
security are to be introduced since the security attacks also forms new shapes and expressions. Generally the security of a 
hardware system is directly proportional to the hardware complexity. It is a challenge to enhance or at least maintain the security 
level with reduced hardware complexity. In this paper an attempt is made to design a part of secure communication system, 
diverting from the conventional methods. This paper focus on hardware efficient design of Substitution Box (S Box), as S Box is 
the most significant part of a block cipher. The proposed design incorporates the concept of both static and dynamic S Boxes.  
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
Substitution Box is the heart of a Block Cipher in which the process substitution is done, introduced by 
Shannon1. A message or a part of it is substituted by some other letters or bits. Now the substituted bits are 
processed instead of the original message. This process kept on continuing until the original message becomes really 
hidden so that no cryptanalysis can recover the original message. The decryption of the ciphered message is done 
just by reversing the process that used to encrypt the message.  
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Security is the most important aspect of any crypto system. It is proved that nonlinearity contributes significantly 
to security. Since S Box is the only non linear part of the Block Ciphers, it plays the most important role in making 
the system secure.  The cryptographic strength and resistance to cryptanalysis of block ciphers directly depends on 
the properties of S Box. Weakness of S Box leads to information or/ and power leakage. An S Box can be static or 
dynamic in nature. In static S Boxes, the data to be substituted is fixed as in the case of AES. In dynamic S Boxes 
like Blow fish or Two fish, the substitution data is generated at run time. 
A new S Box is introduced here with lesser hardware complexity, but at the same time difficult to cryptanalyze. 
The higher security level is achieved with the introduction of additional key bits. The new design combines the 
properties of both static and dynamic S Boxes. Both confusion and key based diffusion are introduced within the S 
Box to get the expected results.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 mentions the functioning of conventional S Box and the properties 
expected. Since AES is the most widely used block cipher, focus is given to AES S Box. Section 3 describes the 
architecture and functioning of the proposed S Box. Decryption process which is slightly different from that of the 
conventional S Box of AES is also mentioned. Section 4 demonstrates the experimental results and verifies that the 
properties required for S Box are achieved with the proposed design. The security enhancement and resistance 
achieved towards both linear and differential cryptanalysis with the proposed design are also detailed. Section 5 
shows the synthesis report and compares the hardware complexity of the proposed S Box with that of the 
conventional design. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Conventional S Box and properties 
In conventional S Box, designed for the most widely used block cipher AES, the total number of message bits is 
split into a sequence of bits groups, each with 8 bits. In the substitution process, the input byte will be substituted by 
another byte from a look-up table. The look-up table consists of 256 data bytes so that there is a one to one mapping 
between any input and the substituted data2. The 8 bit message is split into upper 4 bits and lower 4bits. The data in 
the location pointed by the upper and lower nibbles is substituted for the original data. The same procedure is used 
for reverse substitution in decryption process. Properties requires for a good S Box are given below. 
x Nonlinearity: When there are linear relations between input and output vectors, simple mathematics can easily 
find the mapping. So input to output nonlinear mapping is an essential requirement for a good S Box. This 
property safeguards the S Box from attacks.  
x Bijection: For an n×n S Box, Bijection requires each data to be substituted by a unique data3. 
x Balance: When the truth table of a function carries equal number of zeros and ones, then the function is said to be 
balanced. An S Box S:ሼͲǡͳሽ௡→ ሼͲǡͳሽ௠is balanced if and only when all the m output columns are balanced. 
x Bit independent criteria or Correlation Immunity: To satisfy this criterion, the output bits should act 
independently from each other. That means there should not be any statistical dependencies between output bits 
of the output vectors3,4. 
x Completeness: A Boolean  function f: ሼͲǡͳሽ௠→ ሼͲǡͳሽis complete if its output depends on all input bits. For an S 
Box to be complete each bit of output should be a function of all bits of input. 
x Strict Avalanche Criteria (SAC): The Strict Avalanche Criteria (SAC) was introduced by Webster and Tavares5. 
The concept behind this criterion is, if there is a slight change in the input vector, there should be a significant 
change in the output vector. If a function is to satisfy SAC, whenever a single input bit is complemented the 
output vector should change with a probability of one half. The purpose here is to introduce maximum confusion. 
x Extended Properties- Static and Dynamic: Dawson and Tavares6 proposed an extended set of desirable properties 
of S Boxes using information theory and previous works. S Boxes can be viewed in two ways: static and 
dynamic. In static view, the input and output vectors are considered to be static. On the contrary, in dynamic 
view changes happening in input and output vectors are correlated. Sivabalan et al.7 proposed their own extended 
criteria. This proposes the design criteria at multiple bits level. The reduction in uncertainty due to the 
dependency between output bits  and input bits or one or more output bits and the rest of the output bits are 
focused here. The information leakage is classified as Static Input Output Information leakage – SL[I,O], 
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Dynamic Input Output Information leakage – DL[I,O] and Dynamic Output Output Information leakage – 
DL[O,O]. 
3. New Design: Hardware Efficient S Box 
Achieving reduced hardware complexity with enhanced security level is always a tough task. The new S Box 
design is carried out with the same intension. The approaches used here are: 
x Increase the key size to enhance the security. 
x Instead of conventional 1 to 1 substitution (Bijection), here 1 to p substitution is suggested where p is decided by 
the hardware. 
x Reduced number and size of data stored in LUTs for substitution, which reduces the hardware complexity. 
x Key based permutation to resist both linear and differential cryptanalysis. 
 
Fig. 1. represents the block diagram of the new design. Here block B deals with substitution of data while block 
A and C perform additional operations to provide better security. Block D acts as control element which generates 
and applies random key bits in order to control the operation and enhance the uncertainty. Fig. 2. shows the 
proposed implementation of block B where substitution is carried out. Here the n bit message is divided into two n/2 
bit segments. Each n/2 bit message is connected with one of the two Data banks, each having m number of Look Up 
Tables (LUT). The trade-off between randomness of substitution and hardware complexity depends on the value of 
m. Each LUT carries ʹ௡Ȁଶ number of n/2 bit data for substitution. Each n/2 bit message can now be substituted by 
any of the n/2 bit data residing in the connected Data bank. How the message bits are connected with the LUTs in 
the data banks is shown in Fig. 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Block Diagram of Secure hardware efficient S Box 
 
Selection of LUT is decided by the status of the control element in Fig. 1, shown as block D. A Linear Feedback 
Shift Register (LFSR) is used as a control element. An LFSR with ݈݋݃ଶm bits can select the LUTs of each bank, 
where m is the number of LUTs within the bank. The total number of n/2 bit data in bank 1 and bank 2 is 2m×ʹ௡Ȁଶ. 
All 2m LUTs contain totally different data at same address locations in order to maximize randomness of selection. 
n bit Data input 
n bit Data output 
A – Key based 
diffusion 
B – Data banks with 
substitution data 
C- System to resist 
cryptanalysis 
D – Control element 
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The number of data that can be substituted for a single n bit message is ݉ଶ, since each n/2 bit message has a one to 
one mapping with each LUT.  
 
The limitation of the above circuit is, it is easy to understand which data bank is connected to upper and lower 
n/2 bits, which makes the cryptanalysis easier. The remedy is to introduce block A, which can diffuse the input data 
so that the direct relation between the upper or lower n/2 bits of message and data banks is broken. Further, this can 
increase the number of data that can be substituted for a single n bit message from ݉ଶ to 2݉ଶ. Fig.3 represents a 
simple strategy for key based diffusion using multiplexers. An LFSR bit is used as the control signal to randomly 
interchange upper and lower n/2 message bits of the message. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Arrangements of LUTs for substitution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Implementation of Block A-Key based Diffusion 
 
Even if Block A is introduced between input message and block B, the output from the data banks will be 
changing only in n/2 bit blocks. Definitely the strict Avalanche Criteria (SAC) will not be satisfied here. Block B of 
Fig.1 performs another key based diffusion to satisfy the SAC and to resist cryptanalysis. Fig.4 shows a multiplexer 
based approach for achieving the same. 
 
It uses n number of  n:1 multiplexers to give n bit output. The input bits of each multiplexer are interleaved  in 
such a way that, for each value of control signal, all the n output bits of data bank 1 and 2  reaches the final output 
vector, but permuted differently. So for different control signals the substituted data will appear in differently 
permuted combinations so that there can be n number of combinations. Here also an LFSR provides the control bits 
for multiplexers where the number of bits required is ݈݋݃ଶn. Cryptographic strength enhancement of the S Box using 
DATA BANK 1 DATA BANK 2 
n/2 bit 
LUT - 1, ʹ௡Ȁଶ number of n/2 bit data 
LUT - 2 LUT - 2 
LUT - 1, ʹ௡Ȁଶnumber of n/2 bit data 
n/2 bit 
LUT - 3 
LUT - 4 
LUT - 3 
LUT - 4 
 
Upper n/2 bits Lower n/2 bits 
MUX 1 MUX 2 
Upper n/2 bits Lower n/2 bits 
0 1 0 1
Control 
Signal 
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this circuit is explained in section 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Block C - Circuit to break Cryptanalysis 
 
The decryption process is as follows: For an AES system, the number of rounds is fixed. Since AES is a 
symmetric cipher, the same key is used for both encryption and decryption of the message. For maximum security of 
the proposed design, the additional keys are varied in each round. Since the decryption process is in the reverse 
direction of encryption, one constrain here is to generate the key bits in the reverse direction. It is possible to reverse 
the sequence of LFSR by changing the polynomials. So the decryption circuit will have to find the initial value of 
key by advancing the LFSR polynomial used in the encryption side by r times where r is the number of rounds of 
AES.  After calculating the initial value of key for decryption, the polynomial will have to change for reverse 
sequencing. The reciprocal polynomial is given by, P*(x) = ݔ௞P(1/x), where P(x) is the Primitive polynomial of an 
LFSR and k is the number of LFSR bits. To get the reverse sequence, an LFSR having a reciprocal polynomial is to 
be designed with the rotation of data in opposite direction. 
4. Properties, Security and Cryptanalysis  
      The degree of achievement of the desirable properties of S Box explained in section 2 is discussed here. Also the 
reason why the cryptanalysis fails is explained in this section.  
4.1 Properties: Achieved with the new design 
x Nonlinearity: The number of data that can be substituted for a single n bit data is 2݉ଶ. It is obvious that there 
cannot be a linear relation between all the numbers. The designer should select the S Box data carefully based on 
the usual criteria and conventions. 
x Bijection: The conventional meaning is not satisfied here. However, a one to many (1:2݉ଶ) mapping is achieved. 
There is considerable difference in the size of LUTs in comparison with conventional S Box. This design 
combines the property of static and dynamic S Boxes and gives more security with lesser hardware complexity.   
x Balance: Better balance is possible since number of Substitution data are less. More over the system to resist 
cryptanalysis shown in Fig. 5, does not change the hamming weight of substituted data.  
x Bit independent criteria or Correlation Immunity: There will not be any statistical dependency for output bits 
with output vector. Some results are given in Table 1 to shows this. 
x Completeness: From the Fig. 3 it is seen that completeness is not obtained because each halves of the message are 
substituted separately. But the presence of block C in Fig. 5 ensures completeness by interleaving the bits in such 
a way that each bit of the output depends really on all the input bits.  
x Strict Avalanche Criteria(SAC): Experimentally it is proved that SAC is satisfied but is not merely contributed by 
substitution. Fig. 5 shows how the bits of substituted data are permuted to achieve SAC and the combinations are 
DATA BANK 1 
n/2 bits 
DATA BANK 2 
n/2 bits 
Mux 1 
n:1 
Mux 2 
n:1 
Mux n 
n:1 ….    ….   
   Control Bits 
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given in Table 2.  Table 1 gives the number of output bit changes in output vector due to change in single input 
bit. 
x Extended Properties :Static and Dynamic: SL[I,O] :- Partial information about the input bits will not reduce the 
uncertainty in the unknown output bits because the message is substituted and permuted randomly based on the 
secret key. DL[I,O]:- Information about any changes in the input bits does not reduce the uncertainty in the 
change in the output bits. Table 1 shows the data substituted for consecutive data at input which shows that there 
is no relation with change in input vector and change in output vector. DL[O,O]:- Partial information about any 
changes in the output bits does not reduce the uncertainty in the changes of another output bits, because the 
output is derived only from input and SL[I,O] is satisfied. 
4.2 Experimental results 
Simulation is carried out for the proposed design for n = 8 and m = 4. Table 1 shows that SAC, correlation 
immunity, Completeness, Nonlinearity, SL[I,O], DL[I,O], DL[O,O] etc are satisfied. Choosing value for n and m: 
For the proposed S Box, the total number of 4 bit substitution data is 2m×ʹ௡Ȁଶ = 128. In conventional S Box 256 
numbers of 8 bit data are stored. As far as number of LUTs (m) are concerned, the relation 1<m< 8 holds well. 
Mathematically the best combination is n= 8 and m = 4. 
 
                            Table 1. Substituted data and its properties 
                    
 
 
 
 
4.3 Security and key length 
Key length has a significant role in security. Greater the key length of the system, tougher the cryptanalysis to 
break it. In the proposed hardware efficient design, the key length is extended as given below 
x For block A in Fig. 1, the required key length minimum is ݈݋݃ଶ݇, where k is the number permutations possible 
for the diffusion system 
x For block B in Fig. 1, the required key length is 2 ݈݋݃ଶm, where m is the number of LUTs in each data bank.  x For block C in Fig. 1, the required key length is ݈݋݃ଶ݊, where n is the number of bits in the group to be 
substituted. 
The total number of additional key bits, K = ݈݋݃ଶ݇ + 2 ݈݋݃ଶm+ ݈݋݃ଶ݊ 
Hence the simulated system with k = 2, m = 4, and n = 8 have additional number of key bits K = 8. 
 
Any S Box should be able to withstand both Linear and Differential cryptanalysis. The achievement of enhanced 
resistance to cryptanalysis offered by the proposed design is detailed below. 
 
4.4 Linear Cryptanalysis 
Linear cryptanalysis fails because of the presence of the system specially designed shown as Fig. 5 (block C in 
Fig. 2). The Table 2 shows how the positions of substituted data bits are interchanged to meet SAC. Unless the 
control bits generated by LFSR are known, the linear relation between input and output bits cannot be found out. 
Since the LFSR bits do not appear directly, finding this will be too difficult. 
Message (1 bit change 
for consecutive inputs) 
Data substituted SAC (no. of bit change 
– minimum 4) 
Hamming Weight 
B0 4B  4 
B1 21 4 2 
B3 CA 6 4 
B7 26 5 3 
BF 13 4 3 
BE 62 4 3 
BC 89 5 3 
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4.5 Differential Cryptanalysis 
Suppose x is the input and y is the output of a system when mixed with a key K. 
y = xْK 
when x is changed by Δx to ݔᇱ 
ݔᇱ = xْΔx 
 Correspondingly, 
ݕᇱ =  ݔᇱْK 
=  xْΔxْK 
=  x ْKْΔx 
=  yْΔx 
 
 So in differential analysis, key has no effect on  Δx. But in the proposed design, the differential cryptanalysis can 
be overcome by the presence of block C shown in Fig. 5. Table 2 gives the different input combinations of 
Multiplexers of block C given for an n=8 bit system, chosen for simulation. Each column represents the order of 
output bits corresponding to the different control bits status. 
 
Table 2. Position of output bits for different keys 
Control 
status 
000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111 
Mux 1 6 2 4 2 7 0 3 4 
Mux 2 0 7 2 3 5 6 2 1 
Mux 3 4 0 6 1 3 7 5 7 
Mux 4 1 3 5 4 0 1 6 3 
Mux 5 3 6 7 0 2 4 1 5 
Mux 6 7 4 0 6 1 3 7 2 
Mux 7 5 1 3 7 4 2 0 6 
Mux 8 2 5 1 5 6 5 4 0 
 
An LFSR can be used to generate the control signal which acts as key bits. With differential cryptanalysis, this 
key cannot be eliminated because the key does not appear directly in the output. Instead of performing some 
mathematical operations, the keys are used for permutation. Calculation of difference in consecutive outputs will not 
do the expected job.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. RTL diagrams for Conventional and new  S Box 
Conventional AES Hardware Efficient AES 
  
547 K.B. Jithendra and T.K. Shahana /  Procedia Computer Science  46 ( 2015 )  540 – 547 
 
4.6. Synthesis report  and comparison 
 
The conventional AES SBox and the proposed  hardware efficient S Box are coded in Verilog and synthesized 
using Xilinx ISE Design Suite 12.1. Fig. 5 shows the RTL diagrams for both obtained. Table 3 shows the 
comparison of hardware complexity for conventional and newly designed S Boxes. From the table it is clear that the 
hardware requirement of conventional AES S Box is far greater than the proposed S Box. 
 
Table 3. Comparison of hardware complexity 
Components Conventional AES Hardware Efficient AES 
IOs 17 18 
Cell Usage 
BELLs 1704 265 
AND2 559 128 
AND3 129 0 
AND4 4 0 
AND5 1 0 
INV 642 72 
OR2 314 64 
OR3 52 0 
OR4 2 0 
XOR2 1 1 
FLIP FLOP/LATCHES 8 11 
FD 8 8 
FDP 0 3 
IO BUFFERS 17 18 
IBUF 9 10 
OBUF 8 8 
6. Conclusion and future scope  
Here a new S Box is designed with lesser hardware complexity and improved security. Differing from 
conventional S Box, some key based operations are performed which enhances the security by defeating all kind of 
cryptanalysis. Strategy for resisting linear and differential cryptanalysis is also explained here. The increase in 
number of key bits really contributes to the level of security 
 
An in depth research can be conducted in this area for enhancing the cryptographic features. Cryptographic 
functions can be clubbed in a single module by time sharing basis. This may further lead to low hardware 
complexity and power consumption. 
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